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Abstract: I would like to attack a certain view: the view that the concept of
identity can fail to apply to some things although, for some positive integer n,
we have n of them. The idea of entities without self-identity is seriously enter-
tained in the philosophy of quantum mechanics (QM). It is so pervasive that it has
been labelled the Received View (French and Krause 2006. Identity in Physics: A
Historical, Philosophical, and Formal Analysis. Oxford: Oxford UP: 105). I introduce
the Received View in Section 1. In Section 2 I explain what I mean by “entity”
(synonymously, by “object” and “thing”), and I argue that supporters of the
Received View should agree with my characterization of the corresponding notion
of entity (object, thing). I also explain what I mean by “identity”, and I show that
supporters of the Received View agree with my characterization of that notion. In
Section 3 I argue that the concept of identity, so characterized, is one with the
concept of oneness. Thus, it cannot but apply to what belongs to a collection with
n elements, n being a positive integer. In Section 4 I add some considerations on
the primitiveness of identity or unity and the status of the Identity of
Indiscernibles. In Section 5 I address the problem of how reference to indiscern-
ible objects with identity can be achieved.
Keywords: identity, individuation, philosophy of quantum physics, identity of
indiscernibles, metaphysics of physics
Ταυτότης ἑνότης τίς ἐστιν.
Identity is a certain unity.
-Aristotle, Metaphysics 1018a5
1 The Received View
Lewis famously claimed: “There is never any problem about what makes some-
thing identical to itself: nothing can ever fail to be” (Lewis 1986, 192–3).
Whatever a is, “a= a” has been taken as a trivial truth if there is any.
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However, the idea of entities without self-identity is taken seriously in the philo-
sophy of quantum mechanics (QM). That quantum particles lack self-identity is
not understood here as meaning that they are different from themselves. It means
that the concept of identity does not meaningfully apply to them. To see why one
may come to have such an idea, let us start with a friendly example.
I give you a sealed wooden box with some little balls in it and I ask you to
guess their number. You have no way to look inside. However, by shaking it,
listening to the sounds produced by the balls, and carefully considering the
vibrations, you guess that the number of balls in there is two. As it happens, you
got it right.
It seems to follow that the balls are different: if there are two balls, one must
not be the other. However, one may be suspicious of claims of difference solo
numero. One may think that to ground such claims one needs to individuate1 the
relevant things somehow, so that one can say: “This is one”, “That’s the other”.
And you cannot put your finger on either of the two balls, for they are locked in
the box.
That the balls are indiscernible for you, one may retort, is a merely epistemic
issue, with no relevance for facts concerning identity and difference. That you
cannot single out either ball has to do with your contingent epistemic situation.
If you could open the box, you would easily discern them. Suppose that the two
balls share the same intrinsic properties, a property being intrinsic when some-
thing has it independently from the existence of any other thing (Lewis 1983;
Langton and Lewis 1998). The balls have the same size, colour, mass, chemical
composition, etc. They can still be individuated, in principle, via their spatio-
temporal location: one is never where the other is.
Spacetime coordinates are so important for the individuation of ordinary
things that Quine (1975) proposed to make of them a criterion of identity for
material objects: a is the same material object as b when they share the same
spatiotemporal location. But the Quinean criterion is in trouble when we move
to objects of QM.2 Suppose that, instead of balls in a box, we are dealing with
particles in a quantum mechanical system. Particles can be indiscernible in that
1 That is, according to the Oxford English Dictionary: “to distinguish from others of the same
kind; to individualize; to single out”. So understood, individuation is an epistemic notion: it
concerns the cognitive procedures we use to establish whether we have a case of identity. A
detailed theory of individuation is proposed in Wiggins (2001).
2 Quine’s criterion has been contested also by neo-Aristotelians like Wiggins (2001), who claim
that numerically distinct things can occupy the same region of spacetime, provided they fall
under different sortal concepts (on this debate, see also Baker (1997), Thomson (1998), Varzi
(2000)). Some admit coincident objects of the same sort: see Kit Fine’s double letter example in
Fine (2000).
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they share the same intrinsic properties, like mass, charge, etc. Additionally, no
impenetrability assumption holds, as it did in classical mechanics. In the form-
alism of QM particles do not generally get well-defined trajectories in spacetime
(see the classic Reichenbach (1956), and the nice discussion in Ladyman and
Ross (2007, 134–5)). Physicists can gather empirical evidence that a system
includes n particles in situations where individuating the particles is much
less feasible than your opening the box for the balls. Cortes (1976) considers
the case of a mirror-lined box with two photons, whose trajectories cross in such
a way that one cannot determine the history of each photon anymore even
though there is, at any time during the observation, a fixed number of them:
two – as determined by measuring the total frequency of energy v in the box and
getting 2hv, and by employing Planck’s equation. Domenech and Holik (2007)
speak of the extraction of two electrons via ionization of an atom of helium.3
At this point one may conclude that the problem is not merely an epistemic
one – having to do with how we single out things – but an ontological one – a
problem of identity. Schrödinger drew such a conclusion. According to him, not
only “atoms – our modern atoms, the ultimate particles – must no longer be
regarded as identifiable individuals” (Schrödinger 1996, 162), but also we must
accept that the particles lack identity:
It is not a question of our being able to ascertain the identity in some instances and not being
able to do so in others. It is beyond doubt that the question of “sameness”, of identity, really
and truly has no meaning (Schrödinger 1996, 121).
This is a paradigmatic statement of the Received View. Moving to quantum
states, the View is motivated on the basis of the way permutations of particles
are counted in statistical QM. The number of permutations of m elements of a set
with n members is given by: n!/(n – m)! (n! being n factorial). Permutations are
taken here as ordered tuples. However, in the quantum statistical framework we
divide by m!, getting the binomial coefficient: n!/m!(n – m)!. We find this way of
counting in Planck’s early work on QM and in Dirac’s unification of the Bose-
3 “For example, we could count how many electrons has an Helium atom imagining the
following process […]. Put the atom in a cloud chamber and use radiation to ionize it. Then
we would observe the tracks of both, an ion and an electron. It is obvious that the electron track
represents a system of particle number equal to one […]. The only thing that cares is that we are
sure that the track is due to a single electron state, and for that purpose, the identity of the
electron does not matter. If we ionize the atom again, we will see the track of a new ion (of
charge 2e), and a new electron track. Which electron is responsible of the second electron track?
This query is ill defined, but we still do not care. Now, the counting process has finished, for we
cannot extract more electrons. The process finished in two steps, and so we say that an Helium
atom has two electrons” (Domenech and Holik 2007, 862).
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Einstein statistics for bosons and the Fermi-Dirac statistics for fermions: the key
combinatorial formula used in Dirac (1926) “is simply a suitably amended
version of the well-known expression for the number of ways in which m objects
can be selected from a set on n objects: that is, the number of combinations of n
things taken m at a time” (French and Krause 2006, 102).
The binomial coefficient numbers m-combinations, which are unordered
collections. According to the statistics, thus, swapping two otherwise indiscern-
ible particles in a system does not originate an arrangement which is consid-
ered, for any purpose, different from the arrangement one started with. We have
a determinate number of quanta distributed across states, but there is no fact of
the matter as to which particle gets which state. Since the origins of QM “this
was taken to imply that the particles had lost their identity and were, in some
sense, non-individuals” (French and Krause 2006, xi; see also Ladyman and
Ross 2007, 134). Physicists express the idea with lively metaphors:
The possibility that one of the identical twins Mike and Ike is in the quantum state E1, and
the other in the quantum state E2, does not include two differentiable cases which are
permuted on permuting Mike and Ike: it is impossible for either of these individuals to
retain his identity so that one of them will always be able to say “I’m Mike” and the other
“I’m Ike”. Even in principle one cannot demand an alibi of an electron! (Weyl 1931, 241).
2 Entity and Identity
2.1 “Entity”
I use “entity” synonymously with “thing” or “object”. These terms are employed
in diverging ways in the debates we are to address. But I adopt a minimal
characterization:
An object is anything that can be the value of a variable, that is, anything we can talk
about using pronouns, that is, anything. (Van Inwagen 2002, 180)
So understood, terms like “object” or “thing” stand for blanket notions: they
provide no restriction to our quantifiers. “Every x is such that, if x is a thing,
then x is F” means nothing more and nothing less than “Every x is F”. “Some x is
such that x is a thing and x is F” means nothing more and nothing less than
“Some x is F”.
At the very least, entities – objects, things – have features, properties, and can
stand in relations. Therefore, certain predicates standing for the relevant properties
or relations can be true of them. “Being a property-bearer”, though, is a gloss of
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the concept thing or object, not a full-fledged definition (it is likely that one cannot
do better with such basic notions; we will soon find ourselves having to say the
same about one and identical with). For one can then wonder, what is a property or
a relation? It is something things can bear, or stand in. Thus, properties and
relations are things in their turn, bearers of (further) properties: as old as partitions
the set of people into equivalence classes, divides is a partial order on N+.
Then quantum particles are things, too: physicists talk about particles in a
system, quantify over them, and ascribe properties to them, like having a certain
momentum, position, or spin. We recall that Ladyman and Ross’ aforementioned
2007 book, articulating their ontic structuralist ontology motivated by our best
natural science, and in particular by fundamental physics, is called Every Thing
Must Go, and that they sometimes “go on to deny that, strictly speaking, there
are ‘things’” (Ibid: 121). Sometimes they admit, however, that “there are objects
in our metaphysics, but they have been purged of their intrinsic natures,
identity, and individuality. […] Real patterns are the objects of genuine existen-
tial quantification.” (131, 239). What is denied in ontic structuralist metaphysics
is a specific and widespread conception of things as self-subsistent individual
substances, with intrinsic natures independent from the relational structures
they are embedded in.4
But when thing (entity, object) is understood as above, things will not go. We
cannot dispense with them in our thought and theorizing, for we cannot even
say how to dispense with them without saying something, that is, without
speaking of things. Such notions make for what quantum physicist Sunny
Auyang called the “categorical framework”, which is there whether we think
about the quantum realm or about Austin’s moderate-sized specimens of dry
goods:
Consider the quantum postulate that says the state vector representing an isolated physical
system contains a complete description of its characteristics. Despite the technical jargon,
the logic is plain. Something has certain properties, which are mathematically represented
by a state vector. […] The understanding is achieved […] by extending to the quantum
realm certain logical forms of thoughts, such as the subject-predicate form of propositions.
[…] If the framework is destroyed, say, by the demise of the concepts of properties and
predication, then the quantum world becomes mystical. When “it is such and so” becomes
logically illegitimate, we do not know what to think. (Auyang 1995, 12–13).
4 Schrödinger already protested against the “obstinately lingering doctrine” of substance and
accident as one at odds with the nature of quantum reality (Schrödinger 1964, 76). He connected
such doctrine with the subject-predicate structure of ordinary languages, and quoted with
approval Russell’s mention of the metaphysical prejudices coming from it (Ibid.).
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2.2 “Identity”
According to authors like Wiggins (2001), the concept of identity is as primitive
as the one of predication and co-originary with it: a is F if and only if a is some
F, that is, Fa if and only if 9x(x= a & Fx) (a similar point is made, more recently,
by Otávio Bueno (2014), who uses it to argue against the idea that quantum
particles can lack identity). To appreciate the claim, one needs to lay out a few
features of the concept of identity at issue (a general introduction to the topic is
Curtis and Noonan (2014)). The idea of things lacking identity is often explained
metaphorically by physicists and philosophers, for instance, via comparisons
between particles and virtual money in a bank account (see Hesse (1970)), or in
contexts in which the underlying theory of identity is not fully spelt out. I will
stick to the presentation of the Received View proposed by Steven French and
Décio Krause in their book Identity in Physics and in various papers. For there
the concept of identity in play is rigorously clarified, and assigned certain
features. Such features will be essential for the point I aim to make below. In
order not to beg any question, I need to show that the ascription of such features
to identity is shared by French and Krause’s systematization of the Received
View.
I should stress that French and Krause do not subscribe to the Received
View rather than to the opposite view that particles are endowed with (self-)
identity. Instead, they show that our best current physics is underdetermined
between two such opposite metaphysical packages. They then provide a set-
theoretic framework, called quasi-set theory (Ch. 7), suitable for the mathematics
of QM if one interprets the theory in conformity with the Received View. But they
also show (Ch. 4) that the view according to which particles are individuals to
which the concept of identity applies is compatible with our current physics.
Firstly, then, identity is not a relation between names of objects, but
between the objects themselves (French and Krause 2006, 4–5). Unlike the
Begriffschrift’s Frege, that is, we do not believe that names “a” and “b” stand
in that relation when they name the same thing. Rather, we “will follow the later
Frege and insist that to state that item a is identical to item b, written symbo-
lically, a= b, means that there are not two distinct items in reality, but only one”
(Ibid).5
5 In a famous passage of the Metaphysics, part of which is quoted at the beginning of this
paper, Aristotle argues that in order to say that the same thing is identical with itself (αὐτò αὑτῳ
ταὐτόν) one has to somehow duplicate it and treat it as two things (ὡς δνσί). In his Commentary
Aquinas says that if the thought that something is identical with itself implies some reduplica-
tion, this cannot mean that something is simul, sub eodem, one and not one. It has to be one
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Secondly, identity is not sortal-relative (as in Geach (1967), Deutsch (1998)):
it cannot happen that a is the same F as b, where “F” stands for some sortal
predicate, without this entailing congruence with respect to all properties (in
particular, a and b’s being the same G for some different sortal G). Although they
speak of the opportunity of applying some sortal theory to quantum particles
(ibid: 347–50), French and Krause never question the Indiscernibility of
Identicals (see e. g. ibid: 251, 255), the claim that if a is b, then any property of
a is a property of b and vice versa. A theory of sortal concepts is anyway in
principle compatible with a conception of identity that complies with the
Indiscernibility of Identicals: Wiggins (2001) makes for a paradigmatic example.
Thirdly, identity admits no vagueness or degrees (as in van Inwagen (1990,
Section 18)): there are no things a and b, such that it is de re indeterminate or
vague whether a = b or not (the key paper in this area is the one-page Evans
(1978)). In French and Krause’s quasi-set-theoretic framework either the
objects at issue are such that the concept of identity applies to them, or not.
If the concept of identity applies to a and b, either they are the same, or not
(and if they are the same, they are members of the same sets, French and
Krause (2006, 277)). Unlike other set-theoretic frameworks for quantum theory
such as Dalla Chiara and Toraldo di Francia’s (1993) quaset theory, French and
Krause’s is no fuzzy set theory (see ibid: 293, 319). If the concept of identity
does not apply to a or b, then it does not make sense to claim, within the
theory, that it is indeterminate or vague whether a is b: “a = b” is not a well-
formed formula (see ibid: 276). And no operator (expressing indeterminacy, or
of other kind) can yield a well-formed formula when prefixed to a non-well-
formed formula.
3 Identity as Unity
While the point that facts about cardinality entail facts about identity has been
made in the literature (e. g., besides the aforementioned Bueno (2014), see
Jantzen (2011), Dorato and Morganti (2013)), this paper aims at phrasing it in
terms of a priori conceptual analysis. French and Krause’s (2006) reconstruction
shows that our best fundamental physics is underdetermined between two
and not one under different respects. And the different respects are, on the one hand, one
object, and on the other hand, a subject who, thinking the object as identical with itself,
considers it as two (utitur eo quod est unum secundum rem, ut duobus: see In Metaph. 912).
But then, the only duplication we have is a duplication in ways of representing.
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incompatible metaphysical packages: one according to which particles are
individuals, that is, identity applies to them; the other one – the Received
View – according to which it does not. As French and Krause (2006, 189–93)
also show, ordinary considerations concerning theory choice in science do not
help either. When “the problem is, it is not always clear what it is that physics
teaches us!” (Ibid: 190), some clarification may come from conceptual analysis.
Start with the concepts of countability and cardinal. A countable set is one
for which there exists an onto mapping from the positive integers to it (or, a one-
to-one mapping from it to the positive integers), so that the members of the set
can be arranged in a list. Such a mapping cannot be available, however, for
aggregates of particles lacking identity. If it were, the particles could be ordered,
which is what cannot be done according to the Received View. The framework of
quaset theory developed by authors like Toraldo di Francia and Dalla Chiara
(1993), as well as French and Krause’s quasi-set theory, aim at disentangling
quantities from ordering. In Toraldo di Francia’s words:
Can we distinguish this and the other in a system of two electrons? As is well known, this
cannot be done […]. Here, cardinal numbers seem to take over the role we had previously
attributed to ordinal numbers. A system of identical particles has a cardinality; but we
cannot tell which is the first, the second, and so on. (Toraldo di Francia 1978, 65).
French and Krause claim that “countable is ambiguous, between cardinality
and ordinality”, and that “it is only the latter which requires determinate
distinctness” (French and Krause 2006, 15). They also say that “quantum parti-
cles cannot be ordered or counted, but only aggregated in certain amounts.”
(Ibid: 276–7). Their quasi-set theory aims at representing collections of quantum
particles that have a cardinal but no ordinal. But then, there is such a thing as
the number of particles in one such collection or (quasi-)set. It might be that
“there is no way of counting [in the “ordinal sense”] or of distinguishing them”,
but “there is a sense in saying, say, that there are k electrons in a certain level of
a certain atom” (Ibid: 289). Here “k” is a placeholder for a positive integer.
French and Krause speak of “quasi-cardinals” for, unlike what happens
standardly when cardinals are defined as particular ordinals, the cardinals of
quasi-set theory are taken as primitive (Ibid: 276). This does not change much:
“given the concept of quasi-cardinal, there is a sense in saying that there may
exist a certain quantity of m-atoms obeying certain conditions, although they
cannot be named or labelled” (Ibid: 277; I will come to the issue of naming in
our final Section). Aggregates of quanta can be called “uncountable”, but only
in a peculiar sense: like the set of the reals, they are uncountable in that there is
no injection from them to the positive integers, or no surjection from the positive
integers to them. However, one can label one such aggregate with a single
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positive integer: the number of particles in the aggregate. It may be a small
number, like two, as in the case of Cortes’ two photons in a mirror-lined box, or
in Domenech and Holik’s experiment. One may insist that in aggregates of
quanta “there is no difference in principle about which one has which proper-
ties”; still we can “heap them up in different quantities with a total measure of
one, two, or three, and so on” (Teller 1995, 12). Aggregates of quantum objects
can have positive integers making for the number of objects in the collection.
In the framework of quasi-sets proposed to mathematically ground the
Received View, then, neither vagueness nor sortal-relativity prevent the applica-
tion of a notion of identity which is all of a piece with the notion of being one. If
particles a and b were such that it is de re vague or indeterminate whether a is
the same as b, it might be indeterminate whether we have to count one or two of
them. If identity were relative to a sortal, so that a can be the same F as b but not
the same G because a is G while b is not, then there would be no single answer
to the question, “How many things are there?”. But quasi-set theory does not
claim that, whereas the concept of absolute identity does not apply to quantum
particles, a relativized one does, whereby one can say that a and b are the same
F for the relevant sortal F without this entailing congruence with respect to all
properties. The theory has an absolute notion of identity which applies to
ordinary objects (French and Krause 2006, 277). And the urelemente in the
theory, which represent quantum particles, are no vague objects with indeter-
minate identities. If this were the case, there would be no single (quasi-)cardinal
associated to aggregates of such particles – but there is:
As in quantum physics, we may reason as if a certain element does or does not belong to
the quasi-set: the law of the Escluded Middle x 2 y _ x ∉ y remains valid, even if we cannot
verify which case holds. The idea fits with what happens with the electrons in an atom; in
general we know how many electrons there are, and we can say that some of them are in
that atom, but we cannot tell which particular electrons are in the atom. (Ibid: 293)
Suppose the question, “How many particles of such-and-such kind are in
this system?”, gets a single, determinate, non-sortal-relative answer via the
mentioning of some positive integer. Suppose that the answer, as in the exam-
ples of Cortes’ mirror-lined box with photons and of Domenech and Holik’s
electrons of a helium atom, is two. It seems to make sense, then, to claim that
one of the particles is not the other, that is, they are different (Bueno 2014,
Section 3, makes a similar point). Once identity has been characterized as per the
three features above (objectual, not vague, not sortal-relative), this is what
claims of difference and identity mean. That a sentence of the form “a= b” is
true, under this reading of “= ”, means that we need to count one thing: the
thing named “a”, which happens to be the thing named “b” (flag again the
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naming issue, to be addressed below). That we, instead, count two things, means
that that sentence is false. But then its negation, “¬(a= b)”, is true. So a and b
are different. And if the concept of difference meaningfully applies to a and b,
the one of identity does as well. “a= b” is meaningful together with its negation:
adding or removing a negation in front of such a meaningful sentence cannot
turn it into a meaningless one. The concept of identity cannot but apply to
whatever the concept of difference applies to: if – to use Ryle’s jargon – we have
no category mistake in the latter case, we have no such mistake in the former.
When the number of things (in a system) is given by positive integer n, these
things cannot lack self-identity. So understood, identity amounts to unity: to be
self-identical is to count as one. This is how Aristotle characterizes identity in
the quote opening our paper: ταυτότης ἑνότης τίς ἐστιν. So says Heidegger:
To every being as such there belongs identity, the unity with itself. (Heidegger 1957, 26)
Auyang similarly claims:
Identity does not say anything beyond one thing; rather, it discloses the meaning of being
an entity, and the disclosure signifies our primordial understanding. […] “A is A” is
tautological because identity is constitutive of the general concept of the individual that
A is. (Auyang 1995, 125)
4 Primitive Identity and Indiscernibility
Once identity is so strictly coupled with unity, identity ought to share the primi-
tiveness of unity. In this Section, I firstly embrace the view that identity is
primitive. Secondly, I argue that the primitiveness of identity begs no question
in the debate on whether quantum particles have identity, in relation to the status
of Leibniz’s Identity of Indiscernibles. Thirdly, I grant that my asserting the
primitiveness of identity commits me to haecceitates, “thisnesses”, but I argue
that one can understand haecceitas as oneness, in a metaphysically innocent way,
in the framework of standard set theory. Fourthly, I draw some consequences of
the availability of haecceitates, so understood, for the distinction between epis-
temic issues of individuation and metaphysical issues of identity.
4.1 The Primitiveness of Identity
That some concepts are primitive seems uncontroversial: if each notion were
definable in terms of others, we would have a vicious regress or a large circulus
in definiendo (Williamson 2007, 50–1). Definitions must come to an end.
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There being primitive concepts, it is likely that there is no no fool-proof
algorithm for them. Many take the concept of set as primitive. We explain to
students that sets are aggregates or collections of objects, and we elucidate by
giving examples, but these are no definitions. Kripke famously claimed of the
notion of reference that “philosophical analyses of some concepts like reference,
in completely different terms which make no mention of reference, are very apt
to fail” (Kripke 1972, 94). And in The Question of Ontology, Kit Fine treated the
notion of reality as primitive: “we seem to have a good intuitive grasp of the
concept”; but he does “not see any way to define the concept of reality in
essentially different terms” (Fine 2009, 175).
If is a set, refers to, is real are plausible primitives given their fundamental role
in our understanding of mathematics, language, and the world – one may say: if
they are part of what Auyang called the “categorical framework” – so is is one.
Philosophers ask difficult questions about the conditions under which things x1,
…, xn are one in the sense of composing a unity, that is, of having a mereological
sum with exactly x1, …, xn as its parts (the Special Composition Question: van
Inwagen (1990)). This does not change that, in Graham Priest’s words:
The notion of being one thing is, perhaps, our must fundamental notion. One cannot say
anything, think anything, cognize anything, without presupposing it’. (Priest 2014, xv)
If being self-identical is one with being one, and being one is primitive
because of such fundamentality, identity ought to be primitive as well.
4.2 The Identity of Indiscernibles
Does my committing to the primitiveness of identity beg any question against
the Received View? I think not. That identity is primitive is consistent with both
of the metaphysical views between which physics is underdetermined according
to French and Krause (that particles have identity; that they do not). It is
generally agreed by both parties that there are no identity criteria for particles,
such that their identity can be reduced to them. And no non-trivial version of the
Identity of Indiscernibles,
(IdIn) ∀F(Fa $ Fb) ! a= b
applies to particles either way – were a “non-trivial” version of (IdIn) is one which
does not already embed identity within the properties we quantify over in the
antecedent of the conditional.6 If the Received View is right and the concept of
6 See Forrest (2010) for a general introduction to the topic. Saunders (2003) offers a subtle
analysis of different ways of understanding (IdIn). We obtain formulations of different strength
Counting the Particles 79
Brought to you by | University of St Andrews Scotland
Authenticated
Download Date | 9/7/18 1:01 PM
identity does not apply to particles, then (IdIn) is simply moot with respect to
them, rather than finding in them a counterexample, as rightly pointed out, e. g.,
by Ladyman and Ross (2007, 135). On the other hand, if particles are endowed with
identity, then any non-trivial formulation of (IdIn) should be violated by some
particles: both by fermions and by bosons (French and Krause (2006, 153–6)); see
also Ladyman and Ross (2007, 135–6)); and if not by fermions (usually with the
help of Pauli’s Exclusion Principle: see Massimi 2001 on this), at least by bosons
(van Fraassen 1989; Saunders 2003, 2006). Thus, to claim that being self-identical
is primitive because it is one with being one, and that because the latter is
primitive, the former is, does not pre-judge issues in the comparison between
the Received View and its denial.
4.3 Primitive Thisness Is Innocent
If one claims that, their identity being primitive, (at least some) QM particles
defy any non-trivial form of (IdIn), and one specifies that they also cannot have
their identity grounded in their space-time trajectories as is commonly admitted
in the philosophy of QM, is one not committed to some haecceity, or “primitive
thisness”, or “transcendental individuality?” In his seminal paper, Adams char-
acterized this as:
the property of being identical with a certain individual – not the property that we all
share, of being identical with some individual or other, but my property of being identical
with me, your property of being identical with you, etc. (Adams 1979, 6)
depending on whether we include spatiotemporal properties, only non-spatiotemporal ones (so
the debate on (IdIn) quickly involves questions about the nature of spacetime), or only monadic
properties as opposed to relational ones. A famous armchair criticism of (IdIn) based on thought
experiment is due to Black (1952), where the relevant scenario involves two indiscernible iron
spheres. Hacking (1975) criticizes Black by reinterpreting the scenario as involving one globe in
Riemannian spacetime, and French (1995) criticizes Hacking for misunderstanding the relevant
physics. Whether we take this or that non-trivial version of (IdIn) as a metaphysical law, or
rather as contingently true (Casullo 1984), or as contingenly false (French and Krause 2006), all
that matters for us is that any trivial formulation will not allow a reduction of identity to
identity-independent concepts: “Once predicables involving ‘= ’ or its congeners and its deri-
vatives are included within the range of the variable, the formula is neither an analytical
explication nor even a serviceable elucidation of identity. For the formula manifestly presup-
poses identity.”(Wiggins 2001, 63). One of the most sophisticated discussions of the topic of
(IdIn) in the context of QM is the recent Muller (2015). Muller argues that various putative
counterexamples to (IdIn) miss the kind of objects that actually do the discerning: these, called
relationals, can only be discerned via relations, not via properties. Se also Muller and Saunders
(2008).
80 F. Berto
Brought to you by | University of St Andrews Scotland
Authenticated
Download Date | 9/7/18 1:01 PM
I admit being identical with a as a property of each a. But various meta-
physicians are suspicious of the notion of haecceity or primitive thisness, which
they find obscure and objectionable (see e. g. Wiggins 2001, 125–6). I answer
that the haecceitistic properties I need to appeal to, in a set-theoretic context
where properties are represented by their extension, are innocent. And QM is
based on standard mathematics, that is, on standard set theory. Although I take
unity as a primitive notion, I allow the addition of a set-theoretic gloss to it: for a
to be one, I claim, is for there to be {a}: to be one thing is to have one’s
singleton. Each thing, a, has the property of being identical with a. This
property, extensionally, is nothing but {a}, which manifests the thing’s unity.
And the existence of its singleton – its haecceity, in this sense – is guaranteed
to each thing in standard set theory. Primitive thisness or haecceity, so
understood, is kosher to the extent that standard mathematics, that is, standard
set theory, is.
4.4 Indiscernibility as Structure-Relative
Singletons also help us understand what goes on when some mathematical
structures, like those employed in QM, represent certain individuals as indis-
cernible. Because each thing is self-identical (that is, one; that is, such that it
has a singleton), any indiscernibility between things must be relative to a
structure and internal to its viewpoint. A non-discriminating structure lacks
some properties, which are, however, always there, as can be seen from the
outside – ultimately, from the viewpoint of the complete set-theoretic struc-
ture (say, the standard well-founded universe of ZF: the cumulative hierarchy
of sets).
Let me clarify a bit such metaphorical talk of “viewpoints”. Within a set-
theoretic structure (a group, a ring of functions, a poset, a lattice of sets, or else),
one can call elements a and b of the structure indiscernible when there is an
automorphism f on the domain making for the support of the structure, that is,
an isomorphism (a structure-preserving bijection) from the structure to itself,
such that f(a) = b. Automorphisms are permutations. When a structure is well-
ordered, i. e., each non-empty subset of the domain has a least element with
respect to the relevant total ordering, its only automorphism is the identity
function. In such a structure there are no distinct but indiscernible elements
(French and Krause 2006, 265 call such structures “rigid”).
Many structures admit non-trivial automorphisms. For instance <Z, + >, the
additive group of integers, has the automorphism f: Z ! Z, f(x) = -x. From the
viewpoint of the structure we cannot tell any number from its additive inverse,
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for instance 2 and –2. To make them discernible we can add order-imposing
properties like being greater than zero, unavailable within the structure.
However, all of these are set-theoretic structures. Thus, for any a which
belongs to any such structure we have ZF guaranteeing its {a}. From the broader
viewpoint of the standard cumulative set-theoretic hierarchy, each thing will
have its unity, that is, its identity. Any structure can be rigidified, if trivially, by
adding to each element of the structure its singleton.
The distinction between an internal or structure-relative viewpoint and an
external one can be mapped to a distinction between the epistemological view-
point of an observer who cannot, even in principle, discern some things from
within a structure, and the metaphysical viewpoint of things as they are in
themselves. This comes with a sharp separation between issues of identity,
which pertain to metaphysics, and issues of individuation, which pertain to
epistemology.7 From this perspective, to claim, e. g., that “we are unable to
identify individual electrons, hence it is meaningless to speak of the self-identity
of electrons” (Hesse 1970, 50), looks like a slide from epistemology to metaphy-
sics. We may be unable to individuate some electrons in a system. But we
should not extend our theoretical limitations to reality and conclude that the
electrons themselves lack identity, when a conceptual investigation of the
notion of identity-as-unity reassures us that, insofar as we have a positive
integer giving the number of them, they do not.
The factoring out of permutations in the statistics of QM described in Section
2 above, then, has in this sense no metaphysical significance: the ruling out of
some permutations from the overall counting needs to be understood as a
restriction on observables, that is, on what we can discern. This is the epistemic
7 The distinction is often discussed in debates on identity criteria (for an introduction, see
Chapter 3, Section 2 of Berto and Plebani 2015). Talk of criteria of identity is traced back to
Frege’s Grundlagen der Arithmetik claim that “if we are to use symbol a to signify an object, we
must have a criterion for deciding in all cases whether b is the same as a, even if it is not always
in our power to apply this criterion” (Frege 1884, § 52). Some have detected a mixture of
metaphysics and epistemology in the Fregean phrasing (see Williamson 1990, 148–9). A
criterion of identity is not a criterion of individuation, such as the checking of fingerprints by
the police in order to tell whether suspect a is public enemy b. A criterion of individuation
concerns the ways in which we can come to know whether we have a case of identity. A
criterion of identity, instead, is supposed to specify the conditions under which a and b are the
same, independently of how we can decide whether they are the same or not. In Kit Fine’s
words, “the problem of [the criterion of] identity is not the epistemological question of saying
how we can identify the object”; rather, it is the “metaphysical question of what, in the real
world, explains the identity of the object” (Fine 1982, 102).
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reading of the Indistinguishability Postulate by Greenberg and Messiah (1964),
250: when a permutation is applied to a system, we cannot distinguish the result
from the original non-permuted state. Nothing follows concerning the metaphy-
sical issue of the identity of the relevant objects.
From this perspective, states formed by a particle permutation are not counted not because
they do not exist, but because they are simply not available to the particles of the relevant
symmetry type. With the reduction in statistical weight now explained by the inaccessi-
bility of certain states, rather than by the non-classical metaphysical nature of the particles
as non-individuals, one can continue to regard them as individuals for which certain states
are now inaccessible. (French and Krause 2006, 148)
5 Reference to Indiscernible Objects
I have been postponing a problem. I have so far presupposed that we can refer,
by pinning names on them or by making of them values of variables, to
subatomic particles which may be indiscernible but which, if we are right,
have identity. It is not obvious that we can do so. Ladyman and Ross (2007,
136) claim that the problem is especially acute for those, like me, who see
particles as endowed with identity. Indeed the quaset and quasi-set frameworks
were developed having this issue in mind.8 In order for “a= b” to be truth-
evaluable we need “a” and “b” to refer.9 Given the understanding of identity as
oneness, if “a” and “b” refer to one thing, that statement is true. Otherwise, it is
false.
But how can we pin a singular term on exactly one of two indiscernible
photons? Talk of causal connectedness to one of two entangled particles, for
instance, does not make much sense. In van Fraassen’s words:
8 Even David Wiggins’ forceful remark reported above, namely that identity is co-originary with
predication because Fa if and only if 9x(x= a & Fx), now does not look so innocent. As French
and Krause (2006, 320) point out, we cannot introduce an individual constant “a” for a
subatomic particle so straightforwardly in quasi-set theory. For one would normally do it only
after proving some existence condition of the form “9x(x=a)”, and you need identity to be
applicable to the thing for this to be feasible.
9 This may not perforce be the case for “a= a”. There are free logics (see Bencivenga (2002) for
an introduction) with supervaluational-style semantics, where “a=a” gets a truth value even
when “a” is denotationless. The idea is that for any way of extending a partial evaluation into a
total one, that is, whatever denotation we could assign to that term, “a= a” would end up being
true (or, “super-true”). This is not so for “a= b” anyway; for there will be ways of extending
making it true, and ways of extending making it false.
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However obscure the notion of causal chain may be, this view of reference would seem to
preclude differential naming of two photons in the same state – since entering into distinct
causal chains would surely distinguish them in a way that quantum mechanics does not
recognize. (van Fraassen 1998, 89)
Besides, one cannot have uniquely referring definite descriptions. My view
that subatomic particles have self-identity, that is, unity, does not help.
Although each particle, a, uniquely instantiates the property of being a, that
is, extensionally, uniquely belongs to {a}, one cannot pick out a starting from its
haecceity. For one cannot uniquely refer to the property of being a, or to {a},
until one has managed to uniquely refer to a. So that property cannot help to fix
the reference of “a”.
Switching from singular terms to the quantifier-variable idiom of general
sentences may appear to improve the situation. One need not share the persuasion,
of Fregean ascendency, that quantification over objects in a domain is possible
only on the presupposition that singular reference to the elements of the domain
via singular terms is available. It seems intuitive that we can quantify over, and
talk in general of, things we have no way to achieve singular reference to. Maybe
the particles of QM correspond to what Timothy Williamson called “elusive
objects” (Williamson 2007, 16–7): things we can think and speak of collectively –
as elusive objects, for instance – although we cannot single them out and indivi-
dually refer to them for we lack the causal interactions or the descriptions which
would be required. Given that the number of photons in a mirror-lined box is two,
we can quantify over these things, it seems, and claim, truthfully, that there’s at
least two of them: 9x9y ¬ (x= y). Diversity, and thus identity, still are meaningfully
applied to them although we cannot label them individually.
However, in the semantics of elementary languages we normally give the
recursive truth conditions of quantified formulas like “9x9y ¬ (x= y)” by first
assigning values to the variables in the open formula “¬ (x= y)”. We then express
the truth conditions for the whole formula by quantifying in the metalanguage
over reassignments of values to variables. A formula of the form “9xA[x]” is true
(in an interpretation), with respect to assignment s, if and only if “A[x]” is true for
some reassignment, s1, that differs from s only with respect to the object assigned
to “x”. This presupposes that we assign values to variables to begin with. And if
one finds pinning singular terms, “a”, “b”, on things one cannot single out and
individuate problematic, one should find assigning such things as values of
variables “x”, “y”, equally problematic.
This account of the semantics of the quantifiers is often called the “objectual
reading”. Switching to the main contender, the substitutional reading (Haack
1978, 42), is not going to help: that “9xA[x]” is true if and only if some
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substitution instance “A[x/a]” is true presupposes that “a” gets its denotation to
begin with.
The first thing to say on this issue is that, although one motivation for a
quaset or quasi-set theory is to account for objects that, as French and
Krause say, cannot be labelled from the very start, it is not clear to me
what help will come from switching to the formal apparatus of quaset or
quasi-set theory. Whatever problem is caused to the semantics of variables
and quantifiers in ordinary logic by the indiscernibility of particles is inher-
ited by the variables and quantifiers of quasi-set theory. Supporters of the
Received View, including quaset and quasi-set theorists, say a lot of things
about subatomic particles allegedly lacking identity, and do it by employing
the quantifier-variable idiom (see e. g. French and Krause 2006, 277–81).
Declaring some objects identity-less is not going to help with quantification
over them. The quasi-set theory presented in the book and in various papers
has variables that range over things allegedly lacking identity, variables
which can be bound by quantifiers. To pick one example at random, one
who claims:
either the non-individual y belongs to the quasi-set A or not, as in the case of an
atom, where an electron either belongs or does not belong to it, although we cannot
name it unambiguously. Here, y does not act as a name for an individual (French and
Krause 2006, 319)
… while denying that we can name arbitrary particles, is using variables to refer
to them and say things about them.
Even if this is right, it is better to look for a positive account of how we can
assign one of several indiscernible objects as the value of a variable or the
referent of a term. The solution to this issue, in my opinion, consists simply in
claiming that we can fix the reference of an individual constant or variable
arbitrarily. When we do so, we just refer to one of a bunch of objects, and we do
not and cannot know which.
There is nothing special with quantum objects in this respect. Arbitrary
selection of referents is in place also with ordinary objects of everyday experi-
ence. One can think of a man who crossed the Tower Bridge on January 1st,
1980, and name him “Pete”. There are many such men, of course, and even if
one has all the men who crossed the Tower Bridge on that day before him, one
will still not know which one “Pete” refers to. An account that fits the view is
given in Breckenridge and Magidor (2012), Kearns and Magidor (2012). They
convincingly defend the view that this goes on also when we reason, in mathe-
matics as well as elsewhere, via stipulations of the form “Let a be an arbitrary F”
(“Let f be an arbitrary homomorphism on a group”, “Let Pete be an arbitrary
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Londoner”), typically in Universal Generalization and Existential Instantiation
(indeed, Bueno (2014) uses Universal Generalization and arbitrary reference to
argue that identity is presupposed by quantification).
In Existential Instantiation, one establishes that something is such and so,
9xA[x], and assumes: “Now let it be a”, A[x/a]. Then one derives from the
assumption some conclusion, B, not involving a, and discharges the assump-
tion. The argument works precisely because a is an arbitrary thing satisfying A
[x]; there is no point in wondering which one.10 One can tell a dual story for
Universal Generalisation. Arbitrary reference to objects may be a special kind of
reference, but is not per se reference to objects of a special kind, e. g., objects
lacking identity. Pete is arbitrarily referred to, and is an arbitrary Londoner. It
would be gratuitous to say that Pete is thereby a special kind of thing, or of
Londoner.
Arbitrary reference so understood, as Breckenridge and Magidor (2012, 398)
highlight, is especially suitable to explain what goes on when we refer to
indiscernible objects. Two different numbers n are such that n2 + 1 = 0. Call
them i and -i. There is no non-haecceitistic feature we can resort to in order to
discern them, but we can refer to either arbitrarily. If we buy this view of
reference to arbitrary objects, the upshot for the particles of QM is pretty much
the same as for i and -i. As French and Krause also claim:
Consider the superposition formed by a pair of electrons and the spin states “up” and
“down” […]. In this case, we can assert that “there is one electron which has spin up”,
but not “this individual has spin up”; there does not appear to be any way of “picking
out” the individual which has one name, rather than the other […]. In these cases we
simply have to accept that the labels refer, but we cannot say to which individuals they
refer (French and Krause 2006, 214 and 230)
We can achieve singular reference to things we are not able to single out,
such as subatomic particles in entangled states. One such thing can be made the
value of a variable, or the referent of a term. That we do not and cannot know
which particle in a two-particle system is the one named “a” (or made the value
of “x”) and which is the one named named “b” (or made the value of “y”), does
not change that each of the two singular terms (respectively, variables) has
received its own denotation (or, value). “a= b” is perfectly meaningful and
truth-evaluable in the context. And because the number of particles in the
10 The term “ɛxA” had just this function in Hilbert’s epsilon calculus, famously in connection
to the Axiom of Choice. We are not discussing issues connected to the AC in detail here, since
we have been dealing only with finite collections of particles.
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system is two, it is false. Then its negation is true. Via (twofold) Existential
Generalization, “9x9y(x= y)” is true as well.
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